Abstract

This Study highlights that increases in opium poppy cultivation cannot be isolated from the wider socio-economic, political and environmental conditions that prevail in eastern Afghanistan today. The continuing drought, growing population pressure, changes in the balance between household cash and food requirements, and the lack of secure alternative sources of income have all coincided to create the environment in which fewer and fewer households in eastern Afghanistan believe they can meet their basic needs without recourse to opium poppy cultivation. The situation for many households is further exacerbated by a need for both seasonal and long terms loans and the dominance of an informal credit system in which preferential access is given to those that cultivate opium poppy.

Indeed, the Study suggests that whilst opium poppy cultivation has allowed the wealthier socio-economic groups to prosper through the generation of a surplus cash income that can subsequently be reinvested in opium through the provision of credit or perhaps through greater involvement in the trade downstream, it has only provided the majority with a coping strategy to manage their income deficits and accumulated debts. When these factors are combined with a political environment in which both the physical security and the property rights of individuals cannot be protected, it should be of little surprise that households increasingly give preference to short term-low risk livelihood strategies, such as opium poppy cultivation, over longer term agricultural and non agricultural investments where the returns cannot be guaranteed.

The detailed data produced by this Study illustrates the depth and nature of socio-economic differentiation amongst those households engaged in opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman. It reveals that opium poppy cultivation is most concentrated amongst those households with limited access to both cultivable land and irrigation. These households also experience the highest rates of population densities and levels of food insecurity. For these households, wheat or indeed vegetable or fruit crops are not viable livelihood strategies. The data also suggest that whilst off and non-farm income opportunities provide valuable sources of cash income for those households with the greatest proportion of land dedicated to opium poppy much of this is insecure wage labour that is often derived from working as hired labour during the opium poppy harvest. For this group the dependency on opium poppy cultivation is absolute.

However, for the land-wealthy, the Study reveals increased opium poppy cultivation and a greater share of the final yield due to inequitable land tenure arrangements, have been combined with greater diversity in on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income opportunities. Opium sales, whilst still a significant proportion of total cash income, are pooled with the income derived from the sale of other agricultural products and livestock. Non-farm incomes are not only higher but also more secure and diverse, drawing on government salaries, transport and the retail trade. Yet even amongst this group, the Study suggests per capita annual cash income is still only just over the recognised level of absolute poverty of US$ 300. The provision of loans, the sale of opium in the winter season when farm-gate prices traditionally rise, and greater involvement in the trade provide this group with an opportunity to significantly increase per capita income.

The Study also warns of the significant impact that a dramatic reduction in opium poppy cultivation might entail. Aside from a potential reduction in cash income of between 50 and 90% for a substantial proportion of households in the eastern zone who cultivate opium poppy on their land (be it owned, leased or sharecropped), the loss of the wage labour opportunities associated with its cultivation would entail a shortfall of 3.2 million labour days and US$11.7 million in daily wages in Nangarhar alone. With the loss of such a significant portion of household income comes an inability to meet both basic needs and debt repayments. Whilst the latter invokes the sale of land, commodities and daughters into marriage, these rarely result in the full repayment of outstanding loans. Migration in search of wage labour opportunities, or simply to avoid the violence and intimidation associated with unpaid debts, is an inevitable consequence.

And this situation is not without its precedent. The Taliban ban on opium poppy cultivation in 2001 created widespread rural unemployment and a level of indebtedness and subsequent asset stripping, that many households in the region have still not yet fully recovered from. Indeed, some might argue that this particular policy initiative contributed to the level of dissatisfaction amongst the rural population, making the eventual overthrow of the Taliban in October 2001 relatively popular.

The Study recognises that opium poppy cultivation represents an unsustainable livelihood strategy. It places people outside the legal system, constraining their access to government services, increasing the likelihood of arrest and imprisonment, and making them vulnerable to the violence and intimidation by non-state actors. Moreover, where opium poppy cultivation is over extended and impacts on traditional practices of crop rotation, yields of both opium and licit crops are significantly reduced. Ultimately, as in other source countries, its cultivation will constrain the diversification of on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income opportunities.

However, reducing such widespread opium poppy cultivation can only be undertaken as part of wider process of nation building and reconstruction. This not only means enforcing the rule of law and reducing the legal space in which those opposed to the state can operate but creating the appropriate legal and economic environment in which legal livelihood opportunities can be promoted. And here lies the dilemma. How to build a nation state when an illegal industry fuels corruption, ‘crowds-out’ the legal economy, and funds the very forces that seek to perpetuate regional power bases and warlordism? And recognising that the elimination of the opiate industry is an essential part of extending the writ of the nation state, how can the state eliminate opium poppy cultivation when such a large proportion of the population in some of the most populous and perhaps politically and economically influential provinces of the country are so dependent on the crop for their livelihood? The Study concludes that in such a fragile environment there is little space for dramatic policy responses. Instead, there is a need for a more informed approach that recognise the different motivations and factors that influence opium poppy cultivation and target development and law enforcement interventions accordingly. It is argued that whilst more complex, such a targeted approach is more likely to deliver on both drug control and development objectives, which ultimately will contribute to delivering a more secure and stable Afghanistan.