Abstract

The popular explanation for drug crop cultivation is the unrivalled profitability of opium poppy and coca. Indeed, reports of the unparalleled income that can be generated through the production of these crops can be found throughout the media coverage on illicit drug control.

However, this explanation offers little rationale for the patterns of opium poppy cultivation in source areas, such as Afghanistan, where opium poppy is rarely mono-cropped, and where, despite suitable agricultural conditions across much of the country, only a fraction of the total cultivated land was planted with opium poppy, even when cultivation was at its height in 1999.

Moreover, in practice, there are crops being cultivated in each of the source regions that can generate higher net returns than opium poppy. The introduction of diversified cropping systems and the development of non–farm income opportunities have also proven that household income can be significantly increased despite the elimination of opium poppy. Yet, despite these successes, the argument regarding the unassailable profitability of opium poppy prevails.

Much of this argument takes a rather simplistic view of opium poppy cultivation, informed by economic rationalist concepts of profit maximising farmers. Those households that produce opium are assumed homogenous, having access to the same physical, financial, social, natural, and human resources and selling their opium crop at the same time and at the same price. As such, on the basis of crude calculations, there are frequent statements that opium poppy cultivators in Afghanistan earn as much as US$ 2,000 per hectare or more.

Yet in reality there is great diversity in the socio-economic groups involved in opium poppy in Afghanistan and the assets at their disposal. Consequently, there is great disparity in the revenues that they accrue from its cultivation. Some households can earn significant returns on opium poppy by utilising the inequitable land tenure system, providing advance payments on the crop, and selling their opium long after the harvesting season. However, for the majority of households in Afghanistan opium poppy is a means of survival, providing access to land and securing the credit that is so critical for subsistence during the winter months.

This Paper seeks to unpack the different motivations and factors that influence opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and document how these are prioritised across different socio-economic groups. It highlights how development interventions aimed at creating licit livelihood opportunities need to adopt a more strategic and targeted approach that address the different socio-economic groups involved in opium poppy cultivation and the multi-functional role that opium poppy plays in their livelihood strategies.

The Paper draws heavily from in-depth research conducted in Afghanistan from June 1997 until December 1999.i Whilst some of the findings from Afghanistan may be considered context specific, many are generic. Where appropriate these generic themes are supported by examples drawn from a wide range of literature on opium poppy cultivation across an array of producer countries, both licit and illicit.

The first section of the paper, documents the diversity in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. It highlights how arguments regarding the unassailable profitability of opium poppy provide little rationale for the scale and nature of opium poppy cultivation at the national, regional, and household level.

The second section documents the role opium plays in the symbiotic relationship between the resource rich and the resource poor. It provides details of how the traditional land tenure arrangements and informal credit systems have been modified in order to co-opt those households without land, or with insufficient land to meet their basic needs, into opium poppy cultivation. Whilst focussing on the most divergent socio-economic groups within the community, this section illustrates the considerable gains that those households with control over land and financial resources can accrue at the cost of the resource poor.

The third section provides details of the gross and net returns on opium poppy and how these are distributed across different socio-economic groups. It reveals the disproportionate gains that those with land and capital can accrue at the cost of those without.

The fourth section documents the myriad of strategies resource poor households have adopted in an attempt to reduce labour costs and increase their returns on their opium crop. It highlights how, without the use of family and reciprocal labour, opium poppy cultivation is generally not a particularly profitable endeavour for the resource poor in Afghanistan.

The Paper concludes that, in Afghanistan, the economic superiority of opium poppy is, indeed, both a reality and a myth. However, it is a reality for those whose contribution is least and a myth for those that are most deserving. The Paper recommends that interventions aimed at reducing opium poppy cultivation need to recognise the different motivations and factors that influence households in their decision to cultivate illicit drug crops and target their efforts accordingly. In particular, the Paper highlights the importance of developing a better understanding of the diverse livelihood strategies of the different socio-economic groups involved in illicit drug crop cultivation, and the efficacy of adopting a pro-poor approach to alternative development interventions.