Abstract

The counter narcotics policy debate on Afghanistan continues to be shaped by numbers. Political commentators, drugs analysts and the media all focus on the official release of the annual opium poppy survey produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The number of hectares cultivated and the proportion of the total crop eradicated, what some refer to as ‘the metrics’, continue to be cited as the most important benchmarks by which performance can be judged. A reduction in the amount of land cultivated with opium in a given area or nationally is automatically seen as a sign of progress.

When significant reductions in cultivation have occurred in a given area, as was the case in the province of Nangarhar in the 2004/05 growing season and in the province of Balkh this year, it is immediately lauded as a success. The fall in levels of cultivation is typically attributed to the commitment of the provincial and local authorities and on the role of counter narcotics information strategies. Little attention is given to how households have replaced the multifunctional role that opium poppy plays in rural livelihood strategies and therefore whether the shift in cropping patterns is part of a wider process of diversification of both crops and income, or simply a temporary response to a political imperative.

This report suggests that performance measures for drug control cannot simply be seen in terms of reductions in opium poppy cultivation and that there is a need to understand the qualitative nature of any change in cropping patterns and livelihood strategies before labelling changes in any given area a success. It uses fieldwork from nine different provinces to outline that crop and income diversification is taking place in many areas around provincial centres even in those provinces where opium poppy is considered entrenched. In some provinces, such as Nangarhar, Laghman and Baghlan these areas may consist of a number of districts adjacent to the provincial centre. In others, such as Helmand province diversification may only be limited to the area or sub district in closest proximity the provincial centre.

What these various districts and sub districts have in common are well functioning markets. They produce a range of agricultural crops for sale in the provincial centre or for regional markets. Some even produce for export to Pakistan. Complex intercropping patterns are adopted so as to increase productivity and maximise the returns per unit of land. In these areas vegetable traders are mimicking many of the practices adopted by opium buyers, including purchasing the crop at the farm gate and offering advance payments. Consequently the costs of transportation and ‘facilitation fees’ are being met by traders from Jalalabad and Kabul rather than farmers themselves.

In these areas the shift out of opium poppy, which is particularly labour intensive, and into high value horticulture also frees household labour to find work in the city nearby. The proximity of these areas to the provincial centre means that transport costs are minimal and those working in the city can reside in their own household at night, which is preferred by family members from a social perspective and increases their net return on daily wage labour rates. Consequently, the result of crop diversification and a shift out of opium poppy cultivation can be an increase in both the net returns per unit of land as well as non-farm income.

Typically these areas that are adjacent to the provincial centre also see the benefits of being part of the wider Afghan state. The improvement of physical infrastructure such as roads and irrigation has reduced transport costs and improved agricultural productivity. Their proximity to the provincial centre also reduces the number of ‘checkposts’ demanding taxes and bribes and thereby reducing the net returns on licit crops. Communities in these areas also believe there is a ‘security premium’ associated with their location near the provincial centre, enabling investments in crops with longer maturation periods and facilitating the trade of legal goods and services. Eradication is also perceived to be a credible threat and can act as a catalyst for making the shift from opium poppy to diversifying cropping patterns and income streams.

However, the report also highlights that this pattern of change in rural livelihoods is localised and is not uniform across any given province. In those areas where legal markets are severely constrained opium poppy remains a low risk crop in a high-risk environment. It produces a non-perishable, high value low weight product suitable for transporting on poor roads where transport costs are high and damage to more fragile products is extensive. It has a relatively guaranteed market where traders will purchase at the farmgate and thereby absorb the transport costs and ‘facilitation fees’ associated with the trade in legitimate crops in rural Afghanistan. These traders and indeed neighbours will also offer advance payments on the future opium crop prior to its harvest, allowing households to meet their living expenses during times of food insecurity or illness. In many areas growing opium also denotes a capacity to repay debts and will facilitate loans in both cash and in-kind.

As a labour intensive crop opium poppy creates wage labour opportunities for a large swathe of the population who can find work weeding and harvesting the crop at preferential rates of pay. The staggered nature of the crop cycle, varying by altitude and micro-climate can extend the period of employment available for those with knowledge of the plant and who are willing and able to travel to approximately three months. The scale of the labour input required over this period puts upward pressure on wage labour rates in other non-opium related sectors of the economy like in construction, services and agriculture.

The report highlights that those areas in which access to legal markets is constrained are not necessarily remote but may be only a short distance from the provincial centre, particularly in those provinces where the security situation is acute. Pressure to reduce cultivation in these areas through coercion not to plant and eradication has resulted in opium poppy being replaced by wheat and has not promoted a shift to high value horticulture. Without a viable cash crop and with the loss of local off-farm income opportunities associated with the harvest of opium, households have typically been compelled to send increasing numbers of family members in search of work. They have migrated to find employment in the opium fields of other provinces in which a ban has not been enforced, or in the construction industry in regional centres or across the borders to Pakistan and Iran.

Where household dependency ratios are large and employment opportunities limited, or where there are insufficient males within the household to be able leave the women and children unattended, the enforcement of a ban on opium has been found to prompt the sale of long-term productive assets and increasing debts. In the more remote areas where population densities are acute, opium poppy cultivation has been entrenched for some years, and where the support for the government has always been tenuous, resurgence in cultivation can be expected after only one season. In those areas nearer the provincial centre, with better access to assets such as land, water and labour markets, and where tribal structures are less cohesive a prohibition of opium poppy may continue into a second year.

The report highlights that where households have not diversified their cropping patterns in response to eradication the destruction of the standing opium crop can exacerbate political tensions. In many of these areas the political support for the government can often be characterised as at best ambivalent given that contact with the state is often fairly limited. However, eradication can provoke a hostile response and the talk of spraying elicits the threat of violence and/or a declaration of intent to actively support Anti Government Elements. The perception that corruption is endemic amongst those conducting eradication (including their involvement in the drugs trade), and reports of bribery and partiality during implementation further weakens the legitimacy of counter narcotics efforts. The report warns that there is a need to tread with caution to ensure that the right balance between security, governance and economic growth are attained and sustainable reductions in opium poppy cultivation are delivered and growing levels of insecurity in rural Afghanistan are not to be further undermined.