Abstract

Farmer�s decisions over which crops to plant are complex and highly contextual. There is rarely a single determining factor that can explain changes in the amount of land allocated to a crop. A range of different socio-economic, political and environmental factors informs such decisions. The individual circumstances of the households - their resources, aspirations, traditions and values all inform the decisions they make. For many farmers in Afghanistan the options are limited, shaped by the social and economic structures that govern access to assets such as land, credit and labour.1 Insecurity and corruption also limit market access and therefore choices. Any decision over which crops are cultivated and how much land they should occupy has consequences for the other activities that make up the household�s livelihood.

In rural Afghanistan households need to manage risk and uncertainty. As we have seen in the 2007/08 growing season, Afghanistan is a country of climatic extremes. A particularly cold winter that led to the death of an estimated 650 people and a loss of 190,000 livestock2 has been followed by the failure of spring rains across much of the country. It is anticipated that the rainfed wheat crop located primarily in the northern and central regions will fare particularly badly but there will also be lower wheat yields in the irrigated areas in the rest of the country.3 All this is on top of the exponential rise in the retail price of wheat that the country has experienced since December 2007 as a consequence of the rise in global wheat prices and the Government of Pakistan�s ban on commercial wheat exports to Afghanistan. So much so that the Government of Afghanistan now estimates that �3.5 million people are seriously food insecure� and need immediate assistance.

The pre-existing levels of food insecurity, low nutritional status, high rates of morbidity and mortality, as well as weak social protection systems, compound the impact of these particular shocks. Conflicts over land, water and political power are still a fact of life for most rural communities. The wider political and military conflict both within Afghanistan, and increasingly across the border in Pakistan, has led to casualties, the displacement of people, and constrains on the movement of goods and services. Indeed in some parts of Afghanistan travel on the road incurs the risk of intimidation, violence and extortion from a range of both state and non-state actors. Both �nuisance taxes� and the imposition of a �security premium� by road haulers impacts on the competitiveness of goods and services transported over even a fairly short distance. It is against this backdrop that rural households must consider how best to allocate their resources to maximise their welfare, whilst at the same time managing the risk and uncertainty that is so prevalent in rural Afghanistan. There are clearly trade offs that need to be made given the complex and diversified nature of rural livelihoods in Afghanistan. For Afghan farmers it is never simply an issue of focusing their entire effort on a single activity that theoretically might maximise their returns. In fact in the vast majority of cases maintaining what is considered a minimum level of food crop production is given priority and rarely is the total amount of cultivated land available solely allocated to cash crops. This is particularly the case when food prices are increasing as rapidly as they are in Afghanistan.

This Report explores the process of decision-making in rural households in Afghanistan. It is the sixth in the series of what has become known as the �Drivers Report�. The Report is based on 475 in-depth interviews conducted in twenty-three different districts and across nine provinces in Afghanistan. It explores a cross section of households across Afghanistan and attempts to explain the circumstances, socio-economic, political and environmental, which drove them to cultivate opium poppy (or not) in the 2006/07 growing season. As in previous years the report looks at the range of assets that households have at their disposal, their perceptions of the different types of interventions they are subject to, the services that are delivered, and the ways in which the rule of law, particularly with regard to the eradication of the opium crop, is enforced. It also identifies the possible explanations for moving in and out of opium poppy cultivation this year.

The analysis contained within the Report is not intended to be exhaustive; it is limited by sample size, the prevailing security situation, and the increasingly sensitive nature of the subject matter. There is a need to exercise caution when attempting to extrapolate the findings of this work. That said, the report does provide valuable insights into the process of change in rural livelihoods in Afghanistan and gives voice to a population that is so often caricatured by both policy makers and the media in their debates on counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan.

The Report identifies that there is a discernable shift towards wheat cultivation in the 2007/08 growing season. The causes of this shift are multiple and can partly be explained by some farmers abandoning opium poppy because of pressure from the authorities. However, there is also evidence of farmers increasing levels of wheat cultivation at the expense of lower levels of horticultural and fodder production because of the dramatic increase in the price of wheat and concerns over food security.

In some cases the preference for wheat cultivation is particularly pronounced. Nangarhar is the most obvious example with the crop being all but monocropped in some parts of the province. This shift is largely driven by the authorities� desire to deliver another dramatic reduction in levels of opium poppy cultivation. However, the expansion of wheat cultivation at the expense of vegetable production in those districts nearer the provincial centre of Jalalabad gives supporting evidence to those that argue that the consequences of the dramatic rise in wheat prices over the last twelve months is being felt in all parts of the country.

In other provinces such as Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Ghor, there is also evidence of land that was formerly cultivated with opium poppy being turned over to wheat this cropping season. Falling farmgate prices for opium, particularly low yields in some places and the labour intensity of the crop all militate against opium poppy at time of escalating food prices. As such the efforts by the authorities to dissuade farmers from cultivating opium poppy are �pushing on an open door� in some parts of the country.

Respondents in the south remained the only exception. At the time of planting, and despite efforts by the authorities to dissuade it, those interviewed in the south were largely looking at maintaining or marginally increasing levels of opium poppy cultivation. However, this projection took place in November/December 2007 as the price of wheat continued its upward trajectory in these provinces and prior to the end of the planting season. There is a real potential for farmers in the south to diverge from their projected levels of opium poppy cultivation and allocate some of the remaining land that they had initially planned for the opium poppy crop to wheat. Indeed anecdotal evidence collected later in the season suggests that some farmers had actually ploughed up some of their opium poppy in order to plant wheat

Any reductions in the level of opium poppy cultivation this year will of course be welcomed. The peak level of cultivation of 193,000 ha in the 2006/07 growing season caused considerable concern. However, the movement from one annual agricultural crop, particularly a food crop, to another raises questions over the sustainability of such a shift. The sustainability of the reductions in opium production in the province of Nangarhar, in particular, remains highly questionable.

Past experience in this province show how difficult it is to maintain low levels of cultivation in areas where extensive opium poppy has simply been replaced by wheat the following year. The high number of farmers in Nangarhar unable to meet their own wheat requirements despite extensive cultivation highlights the precarious position that many in the province will find themselves this season. In 2007/08 Afghan farmers find themselves compelled to purchase wheat and other food items at vastly inflated prices but with less cash income to do so due to their loss of income from opium poppy. The situation is made all the more difficult by lower precipitation, falling onion prices (a crop that had proven financially attractive over the last three years), as well as the wider deflationary impact of the opium poppy ban. There is the likelihood of increasing levels of violence in the province in response to both the deteriorating economic situation and in preparation for the 2008/09 opium poppy planting season.

Those households with land in provinces such as Balkh and Badakhshan may be better able to manage a reduction in opium production than their counterparts in Nangarhar. Larger landholdings due to the amount of rainfed land available, has meant a greater proportion of households have the potential to meet their household food requirements through their own wheat production in those years of adequate winter and spring precipitation. However, with the failure of the spring rains in northern and central Afghanistan there are concerns over crop failure in the rainfed areas this season thus limiting farmer�s ability to produce grain themselves. Previous research has shown how the expansion of opium poppy cultivation in the early 21st century in Badakhshan can in part be explained as a response to the drought in the late 1990s, the failure of the rainfed wheat crop and the subsequent sale of livestock.

The same balance between livestock, cereals and cash crops exists in Ghor. In fact last season many of those who had retained some of their herds and flocks during the drought elected to abandon opium poppy and invest in livestock, cultivating more land with wheat and fodder crops. Only those who had lost most or all of their livestock during the drought years persisted with opium poppy - despite the fact that the crop had repeatedly failed for the last five to six years. They saw no alternative. With many in the central highlands having lost their livestock this season it is likely that some could return to opium production as a coping strategy.

In the southern provinces the Report suggests farmers are caught between Anti Government Elements (AGE) that are seen to be encouraging cultivation for political advantage and corrupt officials who are at best are seen as complicit in the trade and at worst as being directly involved. Not only has corruption and insecurity increased the transaction costs of doing business in the south but also the threat of being stopped on the main highways by the Taliban, the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) or thieves has led many to cultivate the crop that attracts traders to the farmgate -opium poppy. Moreover, given the role of opium in accessing land, credit and off farm income, as well as water particularly in some of the drier karez irrigated areas in the south, it looks unlikely that we will see anything more than a recalibration by farmers in the south of the minimum amount of land needed to ensure some self sufficiency in wheat production.

It is clear from the Report that Afghan farmers respond to different imperatives in different ways. Therefore it is possible to have dramatic changes in levels of cultivation year on year not only from one province to another but also between districts within a single province. Much will depend on the different socio-economic, political and environmental circumstances in which farmers find themselves. For example, government efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation may be supported in those areas with larger landholdings by a change in the price of wheat whilst in another area with high population densities it might increase the pressure to return to opium poppy cultivation the next season. Similarly, whilst destroying, or threatening to destroy, the opium crop in an area that has viable alternatives may serve to deter cultivation the subsequent season, in another area, where insecurity and the predatory behaviour of corrupt officials hampers the flow of goods and services, eradication may exacerbate the fragile relationship between the state and its citizens. Whilst unattractive to those who wish for simple answers and quick solutions to opium production in Afghanistan, these diverging patterns of cultivation and the fact that identical measures can produce opposite affects point to the fact that developing a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the different factors that influence cultivation, and how they differ by location and socio-economic group, is probably the most important tool for delivering sustainable reductions in opium poppy cultivation.